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I. Introduction
Professor Marci Hamilton has written a forceful and obviously heart-felt book 
that should give pause to committed champions of religious free exercise.2  She argues 
convincingly that religious freedom  is too often invoked to shield opprobrious and 
socially harmful activity, and she describes numerous examples of such abuses that make 
any civilized person’s blood run cold.  Her avowed aim is to debunk the “hazardous 
myth”3 that religion is “inherently and always good for society”4 and to increase public 
awareness (just as her eyes were “forced open”)5 of the dark side of religion in 
contemporary American public life.  She advocates a restrictive constitutional test for
government accommodation of religious practices and supports vesting sole 
decisionmaking responsibility for administering that test in the legislature.  To this end, 
she proposes a principle that measures the social harm that protection of religious belief
would entail.  “The right free exercise doctrine[,]” Hamilton says, “gives a wide berth to 
religious belief, but follows the rule that no American may act in ways that harm others
1
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3 Id. at 1.
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5 Id.  Hamilton presents herself as a religious person who “like many Americans” was once a “Pollyanna 
when it came to religion,” but who has, through the crucible of her extensive experiences as a litigator 
against religious accommodation in a variety of contexts, realized the error and naiveté of her earlier views.
2without consequence.”6  Hamilton also repeatedly invokes the concept of the “public 
good” (or “common good” or “public interest,” as she variously calls it)7 to justify her 
restrained views of religious accommodation.
This review offers a critical appraisal of God vs. The Gavel, in particular of 
Professor Hamilton’s discussion of the complicated idea of the public good and how it 
intersects with the proper consideration of religious free exercise interests.  In Part II, the 
review explains the structure of the book and the framework for Hamilton’s conclusions 
about religious accommodation.  It emphasizes several instances of Hamilton’s use and 
explanation of the concept of the public good.  Part III articulate s Hamilton’s general 
theory of the public good, breaking the concept down into several distinct categories 
suggested by the book itself.  The review critiques the book’s explanation and application 
of the public good principle and suggests that it is an  ambiguous and unstable concept, 
and one that often substitutes for either particular interests or the author’s policy 
preferences on a variety of issues.8  Part IV offers some observations about the principal 
virtue of God vs. The Gavel: Professor Hamilton’s bracing and illuminating exposition of 
the range of recent and ongoing abuses justified in the name of the free exercise of 
religion.  The review concludes by considering whether religious interests can ever play a 
role in the determination of Hamilton’s public good , and if so in what way.
II. God vs. The Gavel
6 Id.at 272.  As Hamilton recognizes, the “no harm principle” has deep roots in the political philosophies of 
John Locke and John Stuart Mill (as well as many others, particularly those of utilitarian persuasion) and 
influenced the views and attitudes of the founding era.  Id. at 260-63.
7
 Since Hamilton uses these phrases interchangeably, I will do so as well.
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 I make this claim only with reference to Hamilton’s arguments about the public good, not as a general 
statement of skepticism about public good conceptions. 
3The book is divided into two parts.  The first discusses six contexts in which 
religions or religious devotees have used their constitutionally privileged status to protect 
themselves unjustifiably or improperly advance their interests.  The second sets forth the 
state of constitutional free exercise doctrine, with particular positive emphasis on 
Employment Division v. Smith9 and City of Boerne v. Flores.10 It defends the principles 
underlying those cases by tracing the historic decline of the idea of religious 
accommodation.  In the final chapter, Hamilton posits “three necessary conditions for 
legitimate religious accommodation,”11 the last of which focuses on Hamilton’s key 
concept of the public good.
a. God
Despite occasional reference to the beneficent power of religion and religious 
belief,12 this book is about religion as a force of evil. It is also driven primarily by the six
real-life, self-consciously concretized contexts that Hamilton examines, each one chock 
full of actual cases and specifics.  Some of the cases are ongoing and Hamilton herself 
has participated as an advocate in several of them.  This fact-intensive approach befits 
Hamilton’s own educative mission for the book. She is none too keen on the insulated 
blindness of the ivory tower; experience with actual cases, in her view, is a much needed 
antidote to what she believes is the commonly shared, “rose- colored,” idealized 
conception of the role of religion in American culture. 13 Hamilton’s highl y 
9
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11 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 275.
12 See, e.g., id. at 4-5, 7, 306.  “Were all religious institutions and individuals always beneficial to the 
public, this book would not be needed.”  Id. at 273.
13 Id. at 7-8.  Her preference for the experiential over the theoretical (or at least her belief that they often 
can be profoundly opposed ways of looking at the world) appears in other of her work and is a relevant 
theme for this review.  See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, What Does Religion Mean in the Public Square?, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1153, 1157-58 (2005) (reviewing JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION (2004) 
4contextualized approach informs approximately two thirds of the book; she explores the 
harmful role that religious institutions have played in the life of children and the active
debates about marriage, land use, schools, prisons and the military, and discrimination.
The sexual and physical abuse of children by persons either operating under 
religious auspices or motivated by religious belief launches Hamilton’s first section.  She 
provides several examples of misused religious authority that have led to the tragic and 
horrifying abuse of children, offering newspaper-style summaries of  the facts and 
litigation history of past and ongoing cases.  She also excoriates religious institutions for 
“actively aid[ing] and abet[ing] the abuse,”14 though what she generally means is that the 
institutions’ reaction to evidence of abuse was often enough to suppress the evidence and 
insist on silence in an effort to protect their finances and public image.15 Hamilton
bristles with indignation both at the abuses and the cover-ups, and it is at this point that 
the building blocks of her general theory of religious accommodation begin to appear: 
A church does have the right to believe at will, but it has no right to use those 
beliefs to justify illegal conduct.  In effect, this reading [the one she opposes] of 
the First Amendment immunizes actions that display callous disregard for 
society’s most important norms.16
(“[Stout] is an ethicist who has resolutely refused to lock himself into the ivory tower to construct the 
theory that “explains it all,” and instead, by walking among his fellow citizens, has identified a complex 
discourse, incapable of being captured by an either/or formula.”)).  There is more than an element of self-
effacement as well as irony in her position on this issue. Hamilton is herself a prominent legal academic 
whose own views on religious accommodation have changed dramatically over the years.  See Marci A. 
Hamilton, Religion and the Law in the Clinton Era: An Anti-Madisonian Legacy, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 359 n.89 (2000) (attributing her old views to “the musings of a young and ill-informed scholar, too 
much at home in the ivory tower”).
14 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 14; see also id. at 30.
15 Id. at 14-15.  Though Hamilton does not discuss it in her examples, a stronger case for “actively aiding 
and abetting” might be made where an institution reassigns a cleric, knowing of his past abuse of children, 
to a different community without warning the new community.
16 Id. at 26.
5Hamilton moves from sexual abuse to a discussion of medical neglect,17 child 
abandonment,18 physical abuse,19 and failure to provide a safe environment for children,20
peppering her treatment of each with highly disturbing accounts of child exploitation in 
the name of religious freedom.
How is it that U.S. law and society have failed to protect these children?  The 
answer, Hamilton claims, lies in the historic misuse of the First Amendment to shield 
religious organizations from liability for the harm they do.  According to Hamilton, this 
“false understanding of free exercise” was rectified in the Supreme Court’s Smith
decision, which “explained that neutral, generally applicable laws certainly can be 
applied to religious conduct.”21
The fault, too, lies in twin fallacies of the popular imagination: the American love 
affair with religion already mentioned and the belief that contemporary society is hostile 
to religion and religious values. She blames certain academic voices for feeding into 
these misapprehensions.  Her bête noire on this score is Professor Stephen Carter’s The 
Culture of Disbelief,22 which she claims misrepresents the realities that most people in the 
country are religious believers,23 that religious viewpoints “fill the public square,”24 that 
religion is not “always moral . . . [or] as innocuous as apple pie,”25 and that religious 
17 Id. at 31-39.
18 Id. at 39.
19 Id. at 40-44.
20 Id. at 44-46.
21 Id. at 47.  Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause was not offended by Oregon’s criminalization of the 
use of religiously inspired peyote by certain Native Americans.  494 U.S. 872.  After the plaintiffs were 
fired from their jobs, the state denied them unemployment benefits.  Id.
22 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE 
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
23 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 7.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 48.
6interests are not “politically powerless.”26  Hamilton contends that the perpetuation of 
these myths by Carter and others has enabled religious organizations to stage a kind of 
socio-legal power-grab, all the while maintaining the appearance of weakness.27
All of this is rather hasty.  Nowhere in his book does Carter claim that most 
people in the country are not religious or that religion does not affect the public views of 
many Americans or that religious interests are politically powerless: 
[R]eligion matters to people, and matters a lot.  Surveys indicate that Americans 
are far more likely to believe in God and to attend worship services regularly than 
any other people in the Western world.  True, nobody prays on prime-time 
television unless religion is a part of the plot, but strong majorities of citizens tell 
pollsters that their religious beliefs are of great importance to them in their daily 
lives.  And today, to the frustration of many opinion leaders in both the legal and 
political cultures, religion as a moral force and perhaps a political one too, is 
surging.28
Likewise, though Carter certainly does discuss at length the moral dimensions of 
religious belief and its important role in American public life, he does not claim that 
religion everywhere and always has been benign or that it is to be unthinkingly embraced: 
The religions enjoy no special immunity from the tendency of power to corrupt –
and of absolute power to corrupt absolutely.  As I write these words, people are 
being slaughtered for their religious beliefs in India, in Bosnia, and in various 
parts of the Middle East.  Closer to home, . . . the African slave trade and the post-
Civil War oppression of the freed slaves and their progeny were often justified by 
a variety of Scriptural passages and Christian doctrines.  Indeed, there is virtually 
no evil that one can name that has not been done, at some time and at some place 
and to some real person, in the name of religion.29
It is true that Carter advocates for a prominent place for religious thought and belief in 
the public square, but he also says: 
Yet one who argues, as I do, for a strong public role for the religions as bulwarks 
against state authority must always be on guard against the possibility – no, let us 
26 Id. at 291.
27 Id.
28 CARTER, supra note __, at 4. 
29 Id. at 83 (footnote omitted).  
7say the likelihood – that some religions will try to use the privileged societal 
position that the First Amendment grants them as an instrument of oppression.30
The point of this seeming petulance is certainly not to engage Hamilton in a game 
of “gotcha” with respect to what may (generously) be called an incidental point in her 
argument (and, after all, she knows what Carter said).  It is instead to note a leitmotiv in 
her presentation of ideas, and one which will resurface at the climactic point when she 
must defend her own crucial concept of the public good.  It is this: Hamilton frequently 
sounds very much like an advocate (and perhaps intends to).  This is understandable
given her profound involvement in a long-running, “fundamental difference of opinion”31
between Congress and the Supreme Court that began in 1990, and her sincere belief in 
the rightness of Smith and Boerne.  Her passionate voice makes for stimulating reading, 
particularly when it comes to the specifics of the gripping cases and legislative histories
with which she has developed such mastery.  But it is less effective when she presents
and analyzes concepts relevant (either because she opposes or espouses them) to her 
philosophical and constitutional views.
Her chapter on marriage provides a useful example of this phenomenon .  The first 
sub-part treats gay marriage and addresses the well-known decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court32 and the critical response of the federal legislature in 2004.33
Hamilton makes plain that she sides with the SJC and the right of gay people to marry.  
She believes that those opposed to gay marriage are interposing their religious beliefs 
30 Id. at 85.  See also id. at 207 where in considering the problematics of teaching about religion in public 
school, Carter suggests that students should study the negative as well as the positive role of religion in 
American history.  Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, 
Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1257 (2002).
31
 Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997).
32
 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
33 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 51-53.
8where they have no business, and thereby subverting the public good: “Once the debate 
cannot be framed by one religious tradition, the door has been opened to a more 
appropriate public debate over the common good.”34  Hamilton roundly criticizes the 
views of Professor Robert P. George, a natural law theorist who opposes gay marriage.  
Relying on George’s comments in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, this is how Hamilton 
characterizes the natural law position on gay marriage: 
Apparently, [according to natural law] the physical characteristics of males and 
females predetermines the law of marriage.  [George’s] circular reasoning implies 
that no legislature should consider the issue other than to reach his religiously 
based conclusion, a conclusion once again that is an argument from theocracy, not 
public policy.  Accordingly, he promoted the idea of a federal constitutional 
amendment to ban all marriages other than those between a man and a woman, 
without entering into the debate over what forms of marriage are best for children, 
the economy, or the public good.  His is a revealed legal regime, not a reasoned 
one.35
One need not be a natural law expert or adherent to sense that much is missing in 
this assessment. Hamilton’s spare statements about the bases for opposition to gay 
marriage from a natural law perspective36 – that its position is “revealed” rather than 
“reasoned” and that it prescinds from the debate over the common good – are, 
respectively, incomplete and flatly incorrect. It is true that the Summa Theologiae was 
intended by Aquinas primarily as a teaching tool for those sharing his religious beliefs,37
and that natural law theory historically has been associated with Roman Catholic 
34 Id. at 57.
35 Id. at 53-54.
36
 I use the term with reservations, as there is great variety within the modern tradition alone (to say nothing 
of the tradition dating from Aquinas).  The natural law theory of John Finnis, Robert George, and Germain 
Grisez is not that of Lloyd Weinreb, or Michael Moore, or Mark Murphy, and so on.  Moreover, the phrase
“natural law” is itself commonly used in widely divergent meta-ethical senses.  See Michael S. Moore, Law 
as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 190-92 (Robert P. George, ed. 1992) (listing four 
different such usages, only one of which is tied directly to the idea that “the nature of moral qualities like 
goodness is given by their having been commanded by God”).   
37
 Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 17 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmonson eds., 2005).
9teaching.38  But to say that a position based in natural law is not “reasoned” but 
“revealed” is to ignore the highly rational, practical impetus that its adherents claim 
drives the tradition.  In elaborating his understanding of natural law, John Finnis (to take 
one natural law theorist who also opposes homosexual marriage)39 is emphatic that 
“practical reason,” not revealed truth, is the guiding principle by which people may 
decide what it is moral.40 Of marriage, Finnis says: 
The good of marriage is one of the basic human goods to which human choice 
and action are directed by the first principles of practical reason . . . . [T]he good 
of marriage [is] the way of life made intelligible and choiceworthy by its twin 
orientation towards the procreation, support and education of children and the 
mutual support and amicitia [friendship] of spouses who, at all levels of their 
being, are sexually complementary.41
In criticizing this position, it is possible that Hamilton means to say that the 
natural law view of gay marriage (accepting for the sake of this point that Finnis’s and 
George’s position is representative) is not accessible (as opposed to either irrational or 
unintelligible) to people who do not share certain religious convictions, and so should not 
be relied upon in political decisionmaking.  This argument would be reminiscent of
Professor Kent Greenawalt’s reflections about whether nonaccessible grounds should be 
excluded as bases for political decisions.42  Greenawalt also discusses the difficulties in 
38 See Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Public Reasons, 47 VILL. L. REV. 531, 541 (2002). 
39 See generally John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some 
Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997). 
40 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100-101 (1981).  For a different, highly persuasive 
perspective, but one that also emphasizes the connection between religion and rationality, see Michael J. 
Perry, Christians, the Bible, and Same-Sex Unions: An Argument for Political Self-Restraint, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 449, 464 (2001) (arguing that because of the strong bond between “revelation” and 
“reason,” contemporary Christians should be leery of banning or disfavoring conduct if “(a) the belief is the 
subject of increasingly widespread intradenominational disagreement among Christians themselves and (b) 
no persuasive argument grounded on contemporary human experience supports the belief”).  
41
 Finnis, supra note __, at 97, 118 (Finnis here is arguing for an interpretation of Aquinas).  For George’s 
substantial agreement about the “intrinsic human good” of marriage, see George, What’s Sex Got To Do 
With It? Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 70-72 (2004).
42 KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 39-40, 85-95 (1995) (“What I mean 
by “not generally accessible” . . . [is that] the believer lacks bases to show others the truth of what he 
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disentangling the religious and non-religious reasons that may jointly inform a particular
political judgment.43 Hamilton might be arguing for the exclusion of any political 
judgment whose basis cannot be entirely disentangled from religious belief because 
religious beliefs are not accessible, and therefore any judgment that implicates religious 
belief is not accessible.  But if Hamilton intended to proceed along this line of inquiry –
that is, with an eye toward arguing for the total exclusion of the influence of religious 
belief from public political judgment (or debate) – then it is odd that she unequivocally
rejects the plausibility of such an approach.44
It could also be that Hamilton means that though the Finnis/George view of gay 
marriage is at some (remote) level accessible, it is not persuasive on grounds of reason 
alone.  For example, Hamilton might claim that she, like many others, cannot reconcile 
believes . . . . This does not mean that reason plays no part in the development of religious convictions.  
Possible religious understandings may be measured against various tests of reasonableness.  But something 
more is involved: a choice or judgment based on personal experience that goes beyond what reason can 
establish.”).  A belief based on revelation would in most circumstances not be accessible, unless the 
believer can point to a historical, evidentiary record to support it.  Id. at 41.  A belief would be 
“unintelligible” if the believer could not render his belief comprehensible to others.  Thus, a belief based on 
revelation might often be intelligible though not accessible. 
43 See, e.g., id. at 88-89.  Taking as his point de départ the natural law view that “virtually all[] ethical and 
political truths are accessible to common human reason, [and] that understanding these truths does not 
require an understanding of religious truth,” he dissects the problem of intertwining bases of belief: “In my 
discussion of what constitutes reliance on religious grounds in chapter 6, I mentioned how religious 
premises may intertwine with naturalist reasoning . . . . I also mentioned a second problem, that people may 
believe natural arguments are sound because of religious authority, not because they perceive the intrinsic 
force of the arguments.  A third problem is a variation on the second; someone might find the natural 
arguments somewhat persuasive by themselves, but be much more certain of their truth because of 
religious belief.”
44 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 293; see also Marci A. Hamilton, What Does “Religion” Mean in the Public 
Square, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (2005) (“No matter how finely spun the theories that require reason 
and reason alone to ground public policy are, there has never been a time in the United States when religion 
has not been a driving force behind social policy, let alone excluded.”).  
Hamilton contends that Greenawalt endorses the exclusive position, HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 
292-93, but this is a misreading.  See Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Political Judgments, 36 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 401, 404 (2001) (“My own answer to the place of religious grounds is an 
intermediate one . . . . I believe legislators [Professor Greenawalt distinguishes between officials and 
citizens, and then again among officials between legislators and judges] should give greater weight to 
reasons that are generally available than to reasons they understand are not generally available.  But some 
reliance on religious reasons is appropriate, especially since the generally available reasons are radically 
indecisive about some crucial social problems.”).      
11
the Finnis/George position by reference to pure reason, and that she therefore suspects 
that religious convictions are lurking in the background.  Hamilton might say that though 
the natural law proponent starts with a principle that most people would accept as rational 
(e.g., “one of the primary goods of marriage is procreation”), he reaches, by a step-by-
step process of what he claims is “reasoning,” conclusions that are highly controversial
and not commonly shared (e.g., “homosexual marriage is morally wrong”).  To this, the 
natural lawyer might reply that his beliefs are rationally discoverable by all persons, but 
that the measure of their objective truth is not taken by reference to what most people 
happen to believe.45  It therefore still remains for Hamilton to explain why the 
Finnis/George position on homosexual marriage cannot be explained by reason alone. 
She might claim that the kind of reasoning deployed to justify the Finnis/George view is 
altogether too categorical and abstract, that it draws arbitrary and implausible distinctions
– ones not based on reason at all – and that it does not give enough wei ght to real-world 
experience.46
In the argument I have constructed, it is at this point that Hamilton’s second 
criticism of the Finnis/George position on gay marriage could resurface.  Hamilton might 
say that it is in the consideration of real-world experience that one is most rational about
the common good;47 or as Professor Greenawalt has said in the context of assessing the 
rationality of natural law’s claims about the wrongfulness of homosexuality and its 
45 FINNIS [NLNR], supra note __, at 30.
46 See Kent Greenawalt, How Persuasive Is Natural Law Theory?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1647, 1667-71 
(2000) (“No doubt, the vast majority of the population could be under an illusion, and a plausible theory of 
why that might be so [e.g., that advanced by natural law] should make us more likely to think that most 
people suffer in this way than if no such theory were available.  But it is also true that coherent theories that 
have seemed convincing at one time appear to be shot with error, even ridiculous, at a later time.  As moral 
agents, we must choose between the weight to give to theory and the weight to give to experience when the 
two conflict.”).
47
 Indeed, such a position would be consistent with her generally practical-minded, experience-based 
approach throughout the book.
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implications for same sex marriage,48 “we have sounder and less sound ways to reason 
about moral matters, and . . . an approach in which experience receives greater weight is 
sounder than highly abstract, categorical analysis.”49 Yet the “common good” is a 
concept of vital importance in the natural law views of George and Finnis; it relates to the 
rational pursuit of self-evident human goods, which itself implies some kind of appeal to 
tangible and accessible evidence.50  Consideration of the “good of marriage” by reference 
to “what forms of marriage are best for children,” either from a theoretical or an 
experiential point of view, is precisely what the natural law has in mind.51 Nevertheless, 
48
 Greenawalt is primarily addressing the natural law position that consenting homosexual acts are morally 
defective, rather than any resulting implications of that position for criminal penalties or same sex 
marriage.  Id. at 1666.  Nevertheless, his treatment of this issue often spills into a discussion of the good of 
marriage, particularly of the good of sexual intercourse within marriage.  
49 Id. at 1673.
50 See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note __, at 134-60; Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. 
JURIS. 17, 19 (2000).  I mean “self-evident” in the way Finnis uses that term.  A proposition is self-evident 
if it is not rationally derivable from some other proposition.  FINNIS, supra note __, at 70.  Self-evidence in 
this sense does not necessarily entail universal acceptance because people may be deceived for a variety of 
reasons.
51
 It is not clear whether Hamilton would include the “good” of procreation on her list, but in American 
law, historically, it has certainly been counted important as a public good (it has been deemed a 
fundamental private good as well, but that is not relevant for this discussion).  See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 13 
Cal. 87, 103 (1859) (“[T]he first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is procreation.”); 
Davis v. Davis, 106 A. 644, 645 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1919) (“The great end of matrimony is . . . the procreation 
of a progeny having a legal title to maintenance by the father.”); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (“[P]rocreation of offspring could be considered one of the major purposes of marriage. . . .”); 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974) (“[M]arriage exists as a protected legal institution 
primarily because of societal values associated with the propagation of the human race.”); Baker v. Nelson, 
191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (“The institution of marriage as 
a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is 
as old as the book of Genesis.”); Heup v. Heup, 172 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Wis. 1969) (“Having children is a 
primary purpose of marriage.”); Zoglio v. Zoglio, 157 A.2d 627, 628 (D.C. App. 1960) (“One of the 
primary purposes of matrimony is procreation.”); Frost v. Frost, 181 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (Supr. Ct. New 
York Co. 1958) (discussing “one of the primary purposes of marriage, to wit, the procreation of the human 
species.”); Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 108 (Fam. Ct. Div. Richmond Co. 1942) (“The procreation 
of off-spring under the natural law being the object of marriage, its permanency is the foundation of the 
social order.”); Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 N.W. 252, 254 (Mich. 1940) (stating that “procreation of 
children is one of the important ends of matrimony”); Lyon v. Barney, 132 Ill. App. 45, 50 (1907) (“[T]he 
procreating of the human species is regarded, at least theoretically, as the primary purpose of marriage . . 
.”); Grover v. Zook, 87 P.638, 639 (Wash. 1906) (“One of the most important functions of wedlock is the 
procreation of children.”); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d 673 F.2d 
1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that a “state has a compelling interest in encouraging and fostering 
procreation of the race”).
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if Hamilton had wanted to take on the Finnis/George position as I have suggested, she 
might have found an inquiry into the theoretical/experiential bases of reason and the 
public good a fruitful one.
This is not the place for full assessments of these difficult views and Professor 
Hamilton is, of course, at liberty to disagree with George’s rejection of gay marriage as
inconsistent with the common good.  But Hamilton’s critique of natural law theory as 
sub- or supra-rational requires greater elaboration and her claim that such an approach
does not account for the common good makes one wonder exactly what she means by 
invoking the concept.  Again, these may appear to be quibbles about non-essential 
matters, but they are germane to  Hamilton’s explanation and defense of her own public 
good concept. 
Hamilton concludes Chapter Three with a discussion of polygamous marriage.52
After presenting the arguments of Mormons for the legal protection of polygamy, and 
noting that there is no constitutional right to polygamous marriage, Hamilton poses the 
following tests for measuring whether polygamy should be accommodated: “The 
question is not whether polygamists may trump the law, but rather whether polygamy can 
coincide with the public good[]”53; “The question for public policy is whether the 
practice of polygamy is consistent with what is best for society, period[]”54; and 
“[Legislators] must also always ask whether the conduct in question comports with the 
public good, and that means they must examine with some care how the conduct impacts 
None of this, of course, necessarily speaks to whether homosexual marriage threatens the public 
procreative aim of marriage (the advent of reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, may be 
relevant in assessing this issue), or whether the public good of marriage has in some way changed so as to 
render procreation less vital. 
52 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 66-77.
53 Id. at 68.
54 Id. at 72-73.
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others.”55 Hamilton appears to have answered these questions for herself.  She believes 
that polygamy perpetuates inequalities between the sexes and may be inconsistent “with 
the rule of law and democracy.”56  Other topics relevant to assessing the “public good” of 
polygamy, according to Hamilton, should include its unclear impact on issues of child 
custody, inheritance, and even the spread AIDS in Africa.57
Hamilton’s own legal expertise is showcased in Chapter Four, which describes the 
conflicts that arise when religiously inclined land owners seek to use their property in 
ways that threaten the character of residential communities.  She has considerable 
experience litigating these cases, most often representing the party opposing the religious 
accommodation (i.e., the locality or the neighbors).58  She describes vividly the acrimony 
generated by these disputes: a religious person who wishes to expand his home to 
accommodate greater numbers of worshippers; the often enormous increase in traffic and 
commerce such plans mean for a residential neighborhood (“generating a traffic pattern 
more evocative of a grocery store than a home”)59; the transformation of a once-a-week 
house of worship into a “multiple-use service center[]”60; the arrival of the homeless, 
seeking food, shelter, and spiritual guidance, into the residential areas, and the resulting 
deterioration of the neighborhood61; and the inevitable legal entanglements and 
concomitant ill will among neighbors, including charges of discrimination.62
Hamilton places the blame for these problems (and many others for what she 
believes is over-zealous religious accommodation) on two federal statutes, the Religious 
55 Id. at 77.
56 Id. at 74.
57 Id. at 76.
58 Id. at 84, 106.  See also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509. 
59 Id. at 80.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 100-01.
62 Id. at 97-98.
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Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) of 1993,63 which was partially struck down in City of 
Boerne v. Flores,64 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”) of 2000.65 RLUIPA requires that if the state passes a land use law that 
imposes a “substantial burden” on the religious use of property, it must demonstrate that 
the law serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that interest.66  With more than a hint of bitterness,67 Hamilton argues that Congress 
abdicated its responsibilities to the common good because it failed properly to explore the 
likely effects of RLUIPA on the rights of homeowners and the relationships among 
neighbors: “RLUIPA has turned neighbor against neighbor and is one of the most 
religiously divisive laws ever enacted in the United States.”68
It bears reflection whether the antagonisms that Hamilton identifies were
simmering all the while.  RLUIPA may have changed the legal landscape, but it seems 
doubtful (or at least, Hamilton has not made a strong case for the position) that RLUIPA
(and RFRA before it) created or even significantly exacerbated the hostilities between
these competing interests.  “[D]ivisive religious discord”69 about the proper use of land is 
63
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. (2005).  
64
 521 U.S. at 536.  RFRA was invalidated as exceeding Congress’s power under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment over the states; it may remain applicable as to the federal government.  Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 n.2 (2005) (noting that several Courts of Appeals have so held, but 
expressing no view on that question).  
65
 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. (2005).
66
 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
67 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 96 (“In 2000, President Bill Clinton (who never met a religious cause he 
would not support as president), signed RLUIPA, saying: “Today I am pleased to sign [RLUIPA] into law . 
. . which will provide important protections for religious exercise in America.”  Then he praised the usual 
suspects behind such legislation, Senators [Orrin] Hatch and [Edward] Kennedy.  (It has not been done yet, 
but one could write a book about their partnership benefiting religious entities).  Not skipping a beat, he 
then thanked the religious groups . . . and the civil rights communities for “crafting this legislation.” . . . . 
To state his point a little more clearly, this was special interest legislation, drafted outside Congress and 
then passed because the members and the president believed the right people were behind it, not because 
they had determined independently that it was a good law for the people.”).
68 Id. at 97.
69 Id. at 103.
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a product of conflicting private interests and beliefs about the good life.  As Hamilton 
suggests, that strife may well be driven by the evolving nature of religious practice in 
America and its incompatibility with other, competing, interests (such as traditional 
notions of home ownership, the desire for a certain kind of neighborhood character, or the 
efforts of a municipality to control expansion).  Still, Hamilton’s criticisms of RLUIPA 
as a potentially aggravating force in this process ring at least partially true; by imposing a 
heavier burden on localities to justify land use laws affecting religious institutions, 
RLUIPA could give the religious institutions an advantage, or at least a standing, that 
they previously may not have enjoyed.70  Yet this is hardly the same as contending that 
such an advantage demonstrates that the public good has been disserved, let alone 
ignored; it simply demonstrates that Congress has made a choice about where the public 
good lies.  Providing an attractive haven for the homeless or encouraging the 
establishment of institutions that will see to their spiritual and physical needs may well 
displease neighboring landowners.  They will be disturbed and their property values 
probably will suffer.  But it would not be unreasonable, let alone an obvious capitulation 
to special interests, for a legislator to conclude that these measures would nevertheless 
advance the public good. Similarly, though Hamilton dismisses the idea that landowners 
and townships may have discriminatory reasons for opposing religious land usages in 
70
 The weight of the additional burden will depend on an individual state’s religious accommodation laws.  
Many states have zoning laws favorable to religious interests.  See generally Donald A. Giannella, 
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part II.  The Nonestablishment Principle, 
81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 539 (1968) (“The greatest number of zoning ordinances grant special exemptions 
for churches in residential areas provided they do not cause traffic hazards, congestion, or excessive and 
untimely noise.”).  Furthermore, Hamilton points out that various states have passed their own RFRAs, and 
though some provide for various exemptions, several others do not.  HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 182-84. 
For those states with their own RFRAs, particularly for those with no or few exemptions (or for exemptions 
other than for prisons and land uses), RLUIPA imposes no additional burden.
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their neighborhood,71 the RLUIPA legislative record “contained statistical, anecdotal and 
testimonial evidence suggesting that [religious] discrimination is widespread and 
typically results in the exclusion of churches and synagogues even in places where 
theatres, meeting halls, and other secular assemblies are permitted.”72 Hamilton
disagrees with this characterization of the record, argues that allegations of discrimination 
were fabricated or inflated for political advantage, and believes that relevant voices were 
not consulted.73  But these are not very interesting arguments – evidentiary points that a 
lawyer might make in a summary judgment brief – and unworthy of her theoretical 
claims about what is best for American society.  More interesting is to assume that the 
evidence is as Congress believed it to be, and to discern precisely what Hamilton means 
by invoking the concept of the public good to support her claim that Congress ignored 
it.74
Hamilton’s discussion of RFRA’s and RLUIPA’s effect on the prison system is at 
once fascinating and slightly irritating.  She begins the chapter by detailing the despicable 
activities and recruiting tactics of white supremacist organizations and gangs in prison.75
Other than a lonely quote from a member of the Aryan Brotherhood that the act of killing 
is rewarding because “it’s a holy cause,”76 the connection between these groups’ 
activities and their religious motivation is not readily apparent from Hamilton’s 
71 Id. at 103-04.
72
 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004).
73 See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 150-56.
74
 It could be argued that if Congress’s primary goal in passing RLUIPA was to eliminate religious 
discrimination and there is absolutely no evidence of any religious discrimination, RLUIPA then fails to 
serve the public good because it targets a problem that does not exist and possibly creates an additional 
source of strife.  I doubt, however, that even Hamilton would argue for such a categorical view either of 
Congress’s intentions in passing RLUIPA (the potential for discrimination is only one reason to favor 
religious accommodation) or of the total absence of any evidence of religious discrimination.  
75 Id. at 141-44.
76 Id. at 143.
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treatment.  In fact, one has the sense that Hamilton may be overreaching in arguing for a 
pervasive link between the two in order lend rhetorical support to her opposition to 
RLUIPA and accommodation generally.  To be clear: I am not suggesting that such 
connections do not exist; they do.  Some white supremacists do derive their views from 
religious organizations, such as the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, Aryan Nation.  I 
mean only to point out that the book’s portrait of the activities of white supremacist 
gangs, in and out of prison, does not make clear whether religious convictions are, as a 
general matter, of crucial importance to white supremacist beliefs.  Still less clear is the 
effect that RFRA or RLUIPA has had on the proliferation of white supremacist belief or 
violence.  The evidence that Hamilton presents that prisons have become a breeding 
ground for radical Islamic organizations is much more compelling, as is the connection 
between the failure of moderate Muslim imam recruitment for the prison population and 
the consequent infiltration of extremist Muslim chaplains, who are more likely to distort 
Islamic belief and inflame the hatred of those already susceptible to terrorist
indoctrination.77 Against the backdrop of these two problems, Hamilton again launches 
into a diatribe against RLUIPA: it was a craven capitulation to special interests, its likely 
effects were not adequately investigated, contrary views were not sought, and the public 
good was ignored.78  Hamilton is rather perfervid here, concluding with the confident 
prediction that the Supreme Court would in short order strike down RLUIPA.79  The
Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with her in Cutter v. Wilkinson,80 holding that 
77 Id. at 144-49.
78 Id. at 150-56.
79 Id. at 155 (“The Supreme Court will decide by July 2005 whether [RLUIPA] is constitutional.  (It’s 
not.)”).
80
 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2121 (2005).  Hamilton is also in the substantial minority of 
scholars who believe that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause.  Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and 
the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 745-46 nn. 224 & 225 (2005).
19
section three of RLUIPA (governing persons confined to institutions) did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.
In answer to the question, “How much trouble can religious accommodation [in 
prison] be?”,81 Hamilton reels off an impressive and extremely amusing list of the sundry 
dietetic, grooming-related, literary, and sartorial requests made by prisoners on the 
ostensible basis of religious belief.82  The Church of the New Song, for example, insists 
that its adherents be served sherry and steak every Friday at 5:00 P.M. in order to 
participate in the “celebration of life.”83  Hamilton cleverly uses this absurd case as a foil 
for her anti-accommodation arguments, but at least some of these gross abuses, as well as 
the cases of dangerous activity in the name of religious belief, could be dealt with by
applying Cutter’s dicta that:
It bears repetition, however, that prison security is a compelling state interest, and 
that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area . . . . Further, 
prison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoners’ religiosity, 
asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.  Although 
RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular practice is “central” to a prisoner’s 
religion, . . . the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s 
professed religiosity . . . .84
Hamilton would likely disagree with this position.  She would contend that courts are 
institutionally incompetent to perform these kinds of inquiries; legislative action, free 
from the sway of special interests, is needed if the public good is to be protected.85
Before turning to the now long-forestalled exploration of Hamilton’s concept of the 
public good (in which her fondness for individualized legislation is discussed), a word 
about the second part of the book is necessary.
81 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 156.
82 Id. at 157-61.
83 Id. at 163-65.
84
 Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2124 n.13 (citations omitted).
85 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 212.
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b. The Gavel
Part Two of the book is primarily about Supreme Court doctrine and 
constitutional history.  Hamilton divides the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence 
into a “dominant” and a “competing” doctrine.  The dominant doctrine embodies two 
principles: “religious entities, just as much as any other citizen, can be forestalled and 
prohibited from harming others and thus can be made to obey a myriad of laws,” and 
religious institutions must not be “subjected to laws that are hostile or motivated by 
animus toward religion in general or any sect in particular.”86  The dominant doctrine was 
first expressed in Reynolds v. United States,87 a case upholding a federal antipolygamy 
law.  Because the statute did not target Mormons in particular, Hamilton argues, but 
merely expressed a neutral public policy preference against polygamy, the law passed 
both strands of the dominant doctrine.88 Where religious animus is “patent,” as in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,89 Hamilton argues that the second 
strand of the dominant doctrine is violated, and the courts properly intervene.  The 
“competing” doctrine is an aberrant strain of free exercise cases that applies strict 
scrutiny (at least in name)90 to generally applicable, neutral laws.91 The competing 
doctrine was repudiated in Smith, “and the rule of law prevailed.”92
86 Id. at 210-11.
87
 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
88 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 211.
89
 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  In fact, the conclusion that the City of Hialeah displayed anti-religious motive only 
received two votes.  Id. at 540-42 (Justices Kennedy and Stevens).  The basis for the Court’s holding was 
that the City ordinance was not of general applicability: it gave greater protection to non-religious killing of 
animals than to religiously motivated animal sacrifice.  Id. at 533-40.
90 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109, 1127-28 (1990) (arguing that though the courts have claimed to apply strict scrutiny in these 
contexts, their review is often less rigorous).
91
 The “competing doctrine” cases in which the religious interest prevailed comprise the “literal handful” 
listed by Hamilton: Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989) (“[T]here may exist state interests 
sufficient to override a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion.  No such interest has been presented 
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Congress reacted rapidly to Smith (as Smith itself obliquely suggested that it 
might)93 by enacting RFRA, whose flaws by Hamilton’s lights have already been 
discussed.  The Supreme Court then invalidated RFRA as it applies to states and 
localities on federalism grounds in Boerne.  Hamilton attributes Congress’s 
“overreaching” in RFRA to a kind of swollen ego; its historic successes in enacting civil 
rights legislation in the sixties, and the deference accorded that legislation by the courts, 
grew into “dogmatic belief in the unassailability of whatever Congress attempted.”94 Yet 
the trend seemingly signaled by Smith and Boerne, and hailed by Hamilton as 
manifesting the proper exercise of judicial constitutional oversight, was dealt a blow by 
Cutter v. Wilkinson.  Relying on the principle that there is “room for play in the joints
between” the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,95 the Court held that Congress’s 
here.”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (denial of unemployment 
benefits to person discharged for refusal to work on the Sabbath subject to strict scrutiny); Thomas v. 
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to unemployment benefits denial to person 
who refused to make armaments based on religious belief).  There is a sixth finger in this handful.  In 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), a case that Hamilton does not list, six members of the Court found a 
free exercise violation in requiring plaintiffs to submit a social security number for their daughter in order 
to receive government benefits.  The plaintiffs believed that use of the number would rob their daughter’s 
spirit.  The six who found for plaintiffs on this claim applied the strict scrutiny standard.  
There is a handful more in which the Court also applied strict scrutiny but where the religious 
interest lost.  See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394-97 (1990) 
(generally applicable sales tax used as against religious materials survived strict scrutiny); Hernandez v. 
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (strict scrutiny satisfied in denial of charitable deduction to Church of 
Scientology for training sessions); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (requirement to 
participate in social security survives strict scrutiny as applied to individual whose religious belief 
prohibited participation); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (denial of tax 
exemption to university that refused admission to anyone involved in interracial marriage survived strict 
scrutiny).  Presumably Hamilton would be as opposed (or only slightly less opposed) to the analytical 
approach endorsed by these cases as she is to those in which the religious interest prevailed.  See Smith, 
494 U.S. at 896-97 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (“Moreover, in each of the other cases cited by the Court to 
support its categorical rule [including Lee], we rejected the particular claims before us only after carefully 
weighing the competing interests.  That we rejected the free exercise claims in those cases hardly calls into 
question the application of First Amendment doctrine in the first place.  Indeed, it is surely unusual to look 
at the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs who happen to 
come before us.”).
92 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 220.
93
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
94 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 229.  
95
 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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special solicitude for the religious interests of institutionalized persons was constitutional.  
It may be argued that the Court’s treatment of RLUIPA in this context is unique, because 
the government’s control over institutionalized persons is “severely disabling”96 to 
religious interests.  The Court’s “foremost” reason for upholding RLUIPA, however –
that it “alleviates exceptional government-created burdens”97 – is perhaps a reference to 
the strong evidentiary basis in RLUIPA’s record justifying the accommodation; this may 
not distinguish it from the land use context.98
Whatever the future holds for section 2, and for continuing congressional efforts 
at religious accommodation, Hamilton’s view that Boerne represents some sort of historic 
fulcrum or “culmination of U.S. legal principles”99 seems to have been considerably 
undercut by Cutter.  Her highly readable, though speedy, chapter on the history of 
religious accommodation in England and early America, emphasizing the decline of the 
moral authority of religious institutions (the iniquities in the name of the “religion of the 
realm,”100 from the Inquisition to the Star Chamber to the Tower of London, are briefly 
recounted)101 and the rise of the common law and the “no-harm” principle102 is all aimed 
96
 Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2121.  On the other hand, substantial deference is traditionally accorded to the 
decisions of prison administrators (in many constitutional contexts including religious freedom) in light of 
safety concerns that are also unique.  See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979) (regulation 
prohibiting prisoners from receiving hardcover books from any source other than a bookstore, publisher, or 
book club, was rationally related to penological interest); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 
433 U.S. 119, 129 (1973) (regulation curtailing prisoner involvement with labor union likewise upheld).
97
 Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2121. 
98
 It may, however, distinguish it from the problems of “proportionality” that led the Court to strike down 
RFRA in City of Boerne.  521 U.S. at 532-33.  The Boerne Court was troubled that “RFRA is so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”  Id.
On the oddity of this proportionality analysis of RFRA, see Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 754-56 (1998) (arguing that the proportionality 
standard has not been applied to many other civil rights statutes).  Professor Laycock represented 
Archbishop Flores in City of Boerne.
99 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 237.
100 Id. at 253.
101
 Hamilton gives the austere Calvinism of the founding era a free pass because of its allegedly justified 
pessimism about human nature, id. at 2258-59, and its emphasis on the idea that “each person was given a 
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to cast the reasoning of Boerne and Smith as the apex of enlightened thought about 
religious accommodation.  The focus of her final chapter, “The Path to the Public Good,” 
brings us to the crux of the matter.
III. The Public Good
One of the most intractable difficulties with Hamilton’s conception of the public 
good is that it does not account for the reality, which she herself loudly proclaims, that 
religion is very important to many Americans.  Since that is so, isn’t it likely that people 
for whom religion is important will feel that their religious beliefs can and should, at 
some level, shape the public good?  Hamilton appears to concede this point.103 And since
religious convictions often do affect the citizenry’s (including the legislature’s) 
understanding of the public good, on what grounds does Hamilton criticize the 
introduction of those perspectives into the public domain?104 Hamilton uses the concept 
of the public good throughout her book and, whatever else may be said about it, she is 
emphatic that it is vitally important and that religious belief alone should not establish its 
contours. In what follows, the review offers and explores a number of possible 
philosophical commitments that might undergird Hamilton’s concept of the public good.
a. The Public Good as the No Harm Doctrine
Hamilton often invokes the concepts of the public good and the no harm doctrine 
as if they meant roughly the same thing: “[R]epresentatives must consider whether the 
liberty accorded is consonant with the no-harm rule.  If so the public good has been 
job by God to fulfill,” which for the legislator is the pursuit of the public good.  Marci A. Hamilton, 
Republican Democracy is Not Democracy, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2529, 2533 (2005); see also Marci A. 
Hamilton, Direct Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 411, 438-51 (2004).
102 Id. at 260.
103 Id. at 293.  
104
 By posing the question in this way, I do not mean to suggest that I believe there are no such reasons.  I 
am simply interested in exploring Hamilton’s reasons.
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properly served.  If not, the public good, and therefore the constitutional order, has been 
subverted”105; “In a republican form of democracy like this one, the laws are enacted to 
serve the larger public good, and no one should be permitted to harm another person
without account”106; “[T]he duties created by a democratic government – the law – are 
created for the purpose of furthering the public good, which is served when bad actors are 
deterred from harming others and punished if they do.”107
The overlap between the no harm doctrine and the public good is at its least 
controversial when one considers Hamilton’s arguments about child exploitation by 
religiously motivated persons.108  It seems intuitively reasonable and appealing to argue 
that the public good is advanced when the physical security of children is achieved at the 
expense of the rights of alleged child abusers to shield their misdeeds in the name of 
religious freedom; the same can probably be said of the interests of religious 
organizations to withhold documents or other information relevant to child abuse 
investigations and the interests of religiously motivated parents to withhold necessary 
medical treatment from their children.  These are clear instances of substantial interests in 
physical security and health competing against less important interests.  
Perhaps less obvious is a situation in which the safety of schoolchildren is 
measured against, say, the religious interest of a male Sikh student in carrying a 
ceremonial knife under his clothing.109 At first glance, the potential for substantial harm 
105 Id. at 279.
106 Id. at 8.
107 Id. at 278-79.
108
 It is therefore no surprise that in other recent work Hamilton emphasizes this particular context when 
analyzing the no harm doctrine.  See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and 
the Public Good, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1099, 1204-1216 (2004) (“A Case Study of the No-Harm Doctrine: 
The Catholic Church’s Clergy Abuse Scandal”).
109 Id. at 114-18 (describing the kirpan, which can range in length from a few inches to as long as three 
feet).  
25
might intuitively outweigh the accommodation; but adequate precautions could be taken 
to limit considerably the occasions for physical harm.  Naturally, the state has a 
compelling interest in the safety of its students and the carrying of knives does not sit
easily with that interest, but Hamilton does not explain why various measures short of 
prohibiting the kirpan altogether could not serve the state’s interest just (or nearly) as 
well.  For example, one court has suggested that the kirpan could be “blunted or dulled,” 
as well as sewn into a sheath, in order to protect the safety of students, and these are 
surely not the only possible measures to reach a religious accommodation while at the 
same time protecting student safety.110  It is not clear why Hamilton claims that “[o]nly a 
flawed legal doctrine would lead a court out on such a weak limb.  Knives are knives, and 
children are not safe in their presence, no matter who they are.”111 A kirpan with a dulled 
edge and point, sewn into a sheath, and perhaps made of something other than metal 
(plastic, for example) might satisfy the religious and state interests.  Knives may be 
knives, but, to paraphrase Magritte, this is not a knife.112
The controversial edges of Hamilton’s no harm doctrine come into focus in some 
of the other contexts she discusses, particularly where the idea of physical harm does not 
apply.  For example, Hamilton might say that legislative opposition to gay marriage 
harms homosexuals, in that it prevents them from enjoying marriage, “a social construct 
that must be determined in light of the common good, not by the reflection of any 
particular group’s religious beliefs.”113  One possible objection, raised earlier,114 would 
110
 Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 WL 477725, at *4 n.7 (Sept. 2, 1994).
111 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 116.
112
 It may be that a Sikh would not accept such an adulterated kirpan.  The point is that there may be 
compromises that the Sikh would accept that would render the kirpan safe.
113 Id. at 67.  I set aside her question-begging assumption that marriage is a social construct.
114 See supra at notes __ and accompanying text.
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be that permitting homosexual marriage harms the institution of heterosexual marriage 
(whether viewed from the perspective of moral realism or, as Hamilton does, as a social 
construct) and those engaged in it.  Hamilton might then reply that the objection is ill-
taken because it injects religious belief into a secular debate, or because the objection 
inappropriately relies on religious reasons.
“Anyone who advocates the Harm Principle owes us an account of harm[.]”115
What sort of harms count in Hamilton’s calculus? In the context of religious 
accommodation, Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell has written in support of the 
principle that “we are free to practice our religions so long as we do not injure others.”116
Likewise, Professor Douglas Laycock has recently stated that “some religious practices 
must be regulated or prohibited to prevent some significant temporal harm to others.”117
Both of these writers, with whom Hamilton vigorously disagrees about the scope of 
religious accommodation, are making arguments that harm is a necessary condition for 
enforcement of laws that limit religious freedom; that is, absent the causing of some 
serious harm, legal regulation of the free exercise of religion is improper. Hamilton 
seems to be making the same claim.  If all three agree as to the basics of the no harm 
principle, how do we account for their disagreement in its application?  
The answer may be that, in practice, the no harm principle is no longer a 
necessary condition for exercising the state’s coercive power because “non-trivial harm 
115
 R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 16 (2001).
116
 McConnell, supra note __ [Revisionism], at 1128 (citing Stephen L. Pepper, The Conundrum of the 
Free Exercise Clause – Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REV. 265, 289 (1982) (“[I]s there a 
real, tangible (palpable, concrete, measurable), non-speculative, nontrivial injury to a legitimate, substantial 
state interest?”)).
117
 Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the 
Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 200 (2004). 
27
arguments are being made about practically every moral offense.”118  Focusing on the 
existence or non-existence of harm cannot answer the question of comparing harms.  Nor 
can an emphasis on “conduct” as distinguished from “intentions” or “attitudes” neatly 
identify the type or category of harm that should concern us.  As Professor R.A. Duff has 
explained in the context of his theory of punishment:
The harm suffered by the victims of central mala in se crimes (such as murder, 
rape, theft, violent assault) consists not just in the physically, materially, or 
psychologically damaging effects of such crimes but in the fact that they are 
victims of an attack on their legitimate interests – on their selves.  The 
harmfulness and wrongfulness of such attacks lie in the malicious, contemptuous, 
or disrespectful intentions and attitudes that they manifest, as well as their 
effects.119
If the no harm principle ever served as a useful threshold determination, it no 
longer does so; most allegations of moral harm now meet (or at least claim to meet) that 
threshold.  For example, in Hamilton’s land use discussion, we have already observed the 
clash and in some cases incompatibility of rival interests (e.g., those of residential 
neighbors, religious institutions and their potential adherents, and municipalities).  All of 
these groups could plausibly claim to be harmed by political judgments antithetical to 
their interests.120 No resolution to these conflicts is readily apparent by reference to the 
no harm principle alone, or even to “balancing the harms” if the frame of reference for 
measurement is the no harm principle itself.  The interests at stake may not only be 
incompatible but also incommensurable.  That is, there may be no way to decide between 
118
 Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 114 
(1999).
119 R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 128 (2001).
120 See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1593, 1611 (2004) (“[I]t is beside the point to argue against a doctrine of autonomy, as Professor 
Hamilton does . . ., on the ground that it will immunize churches from liability for direct batteries on 
unconsenting third parties – that is, for sexual abuse of children.  These and other direct batteries have 
always been the paradigm case of conduct falling outside the free exercise of religion.  Those who espouse 
the antiexemptions position must deal with the tougher cases – the plethora of modern laws that rely on the 
possibility of diffuse or distant harms to restrict behavior today.”) (footnotes omitted).  
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rival positions simply by measuring “harm” (or their respective potential for “good,” for 
that matter).121 How does one measure interests in religious liberty against those in 
property rights, as gauged by their respective potential for harm?  Yet Hamilton
nevertheless claims to have a clear view about where the public good lies.  
There are also some circumstances discussed by Hamilton in which the no harm 
doctrine has little apparent relevance to discerning the public good.  For example, 
Hamilton raises the relatively recent phenomenon of what she refers to as “religious 
prisons” and others have called faith-based rehabilitation programs, noting that “[t]here 
appears to be an increasing amount of evidence that suggests that some religious 
programming in prisons can reduce the recidivism rate.”122 Other than the possibility that 
inmates would be coerced by the state to participate in such programs against their will 
(which would certainly be a harm, but which Hamilton does not suggest is occurring), the 
“harm” in these programs to the participating offender, qua religious123 and as Hamilton 
has reported them, is difficult to locate; and, in fact, Hamilton’s skepticism about the 
programs derives from something other than their capacity for harm.124 Thus, I conclude 
that while a harm calculus is in some cases intuitively related to Hamilton’s public good 
considerations, the no harm doctrine severely underdetermines what she means to express
by the public good.
b. The Public Good as the “Rule of Law” or “Ordered Liberty”
121
 On the incommensurability of competing visions of, e.g., justice and the good life, see generally
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 8 (1981) (“Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be 
easily expanded so as to be so.  But the rival premises are such that we possess no rational way of weighing 
the claims of one as against the other.  For each premise employs some quite different normative or 
evaluative concept from the others, so that the claims made upon us are of quite different kinds.”).
122 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 165.
123
 I put to the side Hamilton’s suggestion that the Christian emphasis of some of these programs “harms” 
other religious entities that might be interested in programs emphasizing their own faiths.  Id. at 168.  That 
is an argument for greater, not less, use of “religious prisons.”
124 Id. at 168-69.
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There is a kind of antagonistic symmetry in the title of the book from which one 
could reasonably infer that Hamilton is contrasting religious accommodation with the 
“rule of law”: as “God” is to “The Gavel,” so “Religion” must be to “The Rule of Law.”
Hamilton often refers to the rule of law as closely related to, if not the same as, the public 
good.  For example: “Those who sacrifice the interests of women and children in the 
name of religion, or the rights of homeowners to religious landowners have imposed a 
system that demotes the public good to a secondary value.  They have subverted the rule 
of law.”125
What does Hamilton mean by the rule of law?  
The rule of law is a canopy of mutual protection reached through legitimate 
processes, under which all members of the society must abide by the same rules 
and observe the rule of no harm to others.  The rule of law is diminished when 
individuals may use their personal beliefs to avoid the law and to harm others.126
Hamilton’s particular inspiration for her rule-of-law ideal as applied to religious 
accommodation derives from the holding and reasoning of Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Smith; otherwise neutral laws of general applicability whose incidental effect 
is to inhibit religious expression do not offend the First Amendment, the alternative being 
an anarchic system in which “each conscience is a law unto itself.”127
The venerable concept of the “rule of law” has been expressed in many ways.  
Ronald Dworkin, for one, has formulated it this way:
Law insists that force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be 
to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as licensed 
or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political 
decisions about when collective force is justified . . . . This characterization of the 
concept of law sets out, in suitably airy form, what is sometimes called the “rule” 
125 Id. at 304; see also id. at 219 (praising scholars who opposed the “competing doctrine” of constitutional 
religious accommodation discussed earlier as defenders of the rule of law).
126 Id. at 303.
127
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.  
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of law.  It is compatible with a great many competing claims about exactly which 
rights and responsibilities . . . do follow from past political decisions of the right 
sort and for that reason do license or require coercive enforcement.128
There is obviously one aspect of the rule of law, captured by Dworkin’s statement (and 
others’),129 that is procedural (or “instrumental”)130; laws should be clear, they should be 
validly enacted, they should be applied generally and consistently, and like cases should 
be treated alike.131 Along similar lines, Professor Ronald Cass has listed four traits of the 
rule of law: “(1) fidelity to rules, (2) of principled predictability, (3) embedded in valid 
authority, (4) that is external to individual government decision makers.”132 Hamilton 
certainly intends at least this procedural sense of the rule of law when she contends that 
“religious conduct must be governed by the same laws that govern the rest of us.”133
This hardly ends the inquiry however, because adherence to the procedural sense 
of the rule of law does not necessarily explain why interests in religious accommodation 
are “like” (all) other interests, and should be treated as such for rule-of-law purposes.  In 
fact, there is prima facie constitutional evidence that interests in religious free exercise
are not “like” many other interests that the law might infringe upon or protect.134 There 
is no constitutional limitation on lawmaking as to the rate of speed one may travel on a 
public road.  A law that sets the speed limit surely infringes on one’s freedom of 
movement.  Few would claim, however, that an interest in traveling as fast as one wants 
128 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986).
129 E.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Chapters 2 and 5) (listing eight specific virtues of the rule 
of law).
130
 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 786 (1989).
131 E.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208 (rev. ed. 1999) (“The rule of law also implies the precept 
that similar cases be treated similarly.”). 
132 RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 4 (2001).
133 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 310-11.
134 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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and an interest in practicing one’s religion freely are “alike,” in the sense that the 
government should bear the same burden to justify regulating either activity.
Is there, then, a more substantive sense of the rule of law that could explain 
Hamilton’s reliance on it to support her anti-accommodation argument?  Some would 
answer no.135  Those that might answer yes do so by reference to a “point” or “reason” 
for the rule of law that Hamilton might dispute.136 For example, Professor Todd Zywicki 
has identified “Constitutionalism” as “[t]he first value of the rule of law.”137  By this he 
means that “government power is constrained by “the law,” an external force [by] which 
political decision-making must abide . . . . The rule of law enhances individual freedom 
by permitting individuals to choose and pursue their own ends in life, without improper 
influence from the state.”138  Thus, even those who subscribe to a more substantive vision 
of the rule of law ground their understanding of the public or common good on some 
concept (“constitutionalism,” “liberty,” “human dignity,” and so on) distinct from the rule 
of law.139  Hamilton cannot use the rule of law itself synonymously with her conception 
of the public good.
135 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 212 (1979) (“If the rule of law is the rule of the good 
law then to explain its nature is to expound a complete social philosophy.”); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of 
Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 137 (2002).
136 E.g., FINNIS, supra note __ [NLNR], at 270-76 (“Individuals can only be selves – i.e. have the dignity of 
being ‘responsible agents’ – if they are not made to live their lives for the convenience of others but are 
allowed and assisted to create a subsisting identity across a ‘lifetime.’”).  For Finnis, the rule of law is thus 
a mechanism, valuable on its own terms, that helps to ensure that government assists its subjects in 
pursuing the good life (as he envisions it).  Even Finnis recognizes, however, that “the Rule of Law does 
not guarantee every aspect of the common good, and sometimes it does not secure even the substance of the 
common good.”  Id. at 274.
For Rawls, the procedural rule of law was intimately connected with the concept of liberty (itself 
critical to his central idea of justice as fairness), RAWLS, supra note __ [TOJ], at 210-13, but Rawls also felt 
that breaches of the rule of law would sometimes be necessary to protect against greater deprivations of 
liberty that would occur if the rule of law were observed.  Id. at 213.  It is possible that Hamilton would 
agree with this position, but not likely since her view of the rule of law seems to admit of no exception.    
137
 Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2003).
138 Id. at 4, 7.
139 See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 149, 152 (1987) (“There is no question that the rule of law is a necessary condition for a 
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Many of the same points may be made of Hamilton’s use of the phrase “ordered 
liberty” in connection with the public good, in this book and elsewhere: e.g., “Judicial 
deference to the military in prisons is not the end of religious liberty; it’s just ordered 
liberty.”140; “The liberty that is consonant with the public good is ordered liberty, which 
takes into account both liberty and the public good.”141
The phrase “ordered liberty” has a rich and controversial constitutional history 
that Hamilton oddly does not mention, including its memorable use in Palko v. 
Connecticut142 and its progeny. Perhaps she omits such a discussion because her concept 
of ordered liberty has little to do with advocating for special protections for constitutional 
rights, and more to do with a muscular view of government power, one that is little 
different than the holding of Smith.  The phrase was also used by Chief Justice Burger in 
his majority opinion in Bowen v. Roy.143  Faced with a free exercise challenge, the
Supreme Court there upheld a Pennsylvania statute that required a state agency to use a 
social security number in administering certain programs, notwithstanding the claim that 
use of the number would violate plaintiffs’ Native American religious beliefs.  Chief 
Justice Burger offered this rather uninstructive statement:
The First Amendment’s guarantee that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise” of religion holds an important place in our scheme 
of ordered liberty, but the Court has steadfastly maintained that claims of 
just and sane society.  The fear of discretion that is shared by both [A.V.] Dicey and [Friedrich] Hayek is 
well grounded by the more explicit modern treatment of property rights, which shows that ill-defined 
property rights lead to legislative intrigue, political favoritism, and massive uncertainty, all of which tend to 
reduce the levels of both liberty and utility.  But if the rule of law . . . is necessary for a just and sound 
society, it is a very different question to ask whether it is sufficient to achieve that result . . . . [T]he choice 
of the best, even the best achievable, form of political organization demands more than faithful adherence 
to the rule of law can provide.”).  
140 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 172.
141
 Hamilton, supra note __ [Religious Instits, the No-harm doctrine, …], at 1105 (footnote omitted).
142
 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (due process protects citizens against state interferences with rights, such as 
the free exercise of religion, that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”).
143
 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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religious conviction do not automatically entitle a person to fix unilaterally the 
conditions and terms of dealings with the Government.144
As an explanation of the substantive principle of “ordered liberty,” this statement offers 
little, if anything, in the way of guidance.  To the extent it does, however, the principle of 
ordered liberty is used here as an argument in the service of greater, not less, religious 
freedom.145
On Hamilton’s concept of ordered liberty and its association with the public good, 
the criticisms of Professor Carl Esbeck merit lengthy reproduction:
Certainly a republic needs “ordered liberty,” and no one responsible argues to the 
contrary.  But the American republic is also about limited government.  Achieving 
[Hamilton’s] goal of the “public good” requires balance.  That is, neither church 
nor state is absolute, and there are some matters concerning which neither can 
legitimately invade the space of the other.  Professor Hamilton’s argument 
assumes the very issue in debate rather than addressing it.  No one is pressing for 
immunity for religious institutions from the rule of law to the detriment of the 
public good.  Rather, the debate involves defining the contours and limits of the 
public good.  Who gets to decide what is good for the public?  When does a 
pluralistic secular society have to live without a singular rule of law in order to 
accommodate the multiple opinions of what the rule ought to be?  Who gets to 
decide what it means to be a bishop, how he is to go about doing his job, how 
intensely must he supervise the priests in his charge?  [Hamilton] obviously is 
outraged by the Catholic Church sex abuse cases (who isn’t?), but the imposition 
of criminal and tort liability in that worst of all cases does not explode the idea of 
church autonomy.  Rather, it is just a clarification of the location of the church-
state boundary such that the state may impose liability in the extreme cases of 
abuse.146
Like Hamilton’s invocation of the rule of law, “ordered liberty” is merely a starting point, 
a fixed number in the complicated equation that may or may not produce the public good; 
144 Id. at 701-02.
145
 On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger spoke vaguely of “ordered liberty” as an anti-accommodationist 
principle in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972): “Although a determination of what is a 
“religious” belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the 
very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of 
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.”
146
 Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement In the Early Republic, 2004 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1581 n.710 (2004).  Esbeck is responding to Hamilton’s symposium contribution, see 
Hamilton, supra note __ [Religious Instits, No Harm…], which she has said forms the basis for some of her 
conclusions in God vs. The Gavel.
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it tells us nothing about the substantive content of her beliefs as to where the public good 
lies.
c. The Public Good as a Legislative, not Judicial, Function
In theory, Hamilton thinks that the legislature is institutionally superior to the 
other government branches when it comes to deciding on the proper scope of free 
exercise.147 Hamilton emphasizes a few, unremarkable structural virtues of the 
legislative process – the ability to take voluminous testimony pertinent to the particular 
issue, to consider a wide variety of sources, to reverse or modify prior enactments, and
“to reject facts and theories presented to them”148 – that render it the preferred forum for 
public good determinations.  There are many others.149
The difficulty for Hamilton as a practical matter is her frequent disappointment 
with actual legislative decisions that ostensibly aimed at the public good in the context of 
religious accommodation (RFRA and RLUIPA, for two), as well as her assessment of 
Congress’s bloated delusions of grandeur in the twentieth century.150 Still, we have at 
least gone a short distance in defining Hamilton’s public good; we have concluded that it 
is exclusively a legislative consideration (or, perhaps, that it is the legislature’s 
prerogative to assign it in its discretion).  Nevertheless, though we may have descried the 
locus of its determination, we surely have not yet encountered a full explanation of the 
147 See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 212, 275, 285, 295-298.
148 Id. at 296-98.  At least the last of these is overstated as a distinction from the judiciary.  Courts do have 
the power to disregard “facts” and frequently do so, for example, when they make credibility 
determinations or rule on the admissibility of evidence.  
149 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 655-59 (1995) (discussing 
the procedural formality of legislative rules, as well as the simple facts of the considerable size of most 
legislatures and the diversity of the members’ backgrounds, as important institutional qualities in fulfilling 
their deliberative function). 
150 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 227 (“From the 1930s until 1995, the Supreme Court systematically 
deferred to congressional exercised of power.  The result was an unaccountable, headstrong Congress that 
sincerely believed it held plenary power over all issues, despite the plain meaning of the Constitution’s 
structure and language limiting its powers.”).
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public good’s content.  Our next eligible interpretation builds on the legislative focus, 
drawing on the implications in Hamilton’s statement that “[a]ll legislative judgments 
should include consideration of the public interest in order to achieve the ideals of a 
republican form of government.”151
d. The Public Good as Legislative Civic Republicanism
The tradition and (not-so)152 recent revival of civic republicanism is much 
concerned with the “public good” as a model for political decisionmaking , especially as 
contrasted with the view that decisions are (and, perhaps, are best) made through the 
“simple aggregation of private preferences resulting from “deals” among self-interested 
groups.”153  Much of the religious accommodation that Hamilton decries can be 
explained by reference to a kind of faith in an idealized legislative civic republicanism –
the hope that “the elusive voice of the “public good,” momentarily audible above the din 
of power politics, carries the day.”154 Hamilton refers positively, in passing, to legislative 
civic republicanism as a theory that might support her ideas about accommodation.155
She yearns for the “right sort” of legislator: “What is desperately needed in Congress is 
some member who can rise above religious lobbying to secure the larger good – members 
151 Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
152 See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman’s “Strange Career” and the 
Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1998) (book review) (“In the mid-
1980s, it was still breaking news in the legal academy that the Lockean tradition of classical liberalism and 
individual rights was not the only conception of politics to have shaped the ideas and actions of American 
political actors and lawmakers.”). 
153
 Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA 
L. REV. 1405, 1447 (2005).
154 Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1986) 
(citations omitted) (“Republicanism’s ‘animating principle’ is said to be civic virtue.  Civic virtue is in turn 
defined as ‘the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private interests to the general good.’  
Cultivation of this general spirit is ‘government’s first task.’  Republicanism favors a highly participatory 
form of politics, involving citizens directly in dialogue and discussion, partly for the sake of nourishing 
civic virtue.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-57 (1988) 
(discussing the four common commitments of civic republicanism of deliberation, political equality, 
universalism, and citizenship).
155 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 206.
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that at least ask if there is another side to an issue raised by a religious entity, without 
being its servant.”156
In laying out her arguments for legislative civic republicanism, Hamilton
contends that the U.S. legislature is not a majoritarian institution.  Once the majority 
elects its representatives, 
[t]he system simultaneously frees the representatives to do what is best for the 
country – even if the people do not fully understand the issues or agree on the 
course taken – but [sic] it also imposes the difficult burden on elected 
representatives to make independent decisions in the larger public interest.157
As proof, Hamilton offers the racially prejudiced public mood of the 1960s; the 
sentiments then prevalent, she argues, did not prevent the federal government from 
enacting legislation to protect racial and other minorities.  So, too, it has not prevented 
the agendas of “lobbyists representing the disabled, and homosexuals, and racial 
minorities” from faring better in Congress than those of “amorphous majorities.”158
Hamilton’s prior writings about legislative anti- majoritarianism indicate that 
perhaps we are on the scent of Hamilton’s “public good.”  For Hamilton, the dangers of 
popular self-rule are allayed by the Constitution’s “delegation of decision making” 
responsibility to the legislature.159 Mob rule is averted because “[r]epresentatives are free 
of their constituents’ instruction as they are simultaneously driven to consider the public 
good in a fishbowl of public scrutiny within which they operate and seek re-election.”160
156 Id. at 155-56.
157 Id. at 284.  Hamilton is only interested in the model of civic republicanism with respect to the 
legislature.  She does not argue for (and is actually opposed to) the model with respect to the populace at 
large, as many other proponents of civic republicanism have.   See Hamilton, supra note __ [RDIND], at 
2533 (arguing that public majorities should have little, if any, influence in guiding the political agenda).
158 Id. at 284-85.
159
 Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the Whole: A View From the Clergy, 18 
J.L. & POL. 387, 419 (2002).
160 Id. at 434.
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Hamilton’s belief in legislative civic republicanism is challengeable on many 
fronts, space for the development of which is not possible here.  Most glaringly, her faith 
in the possibility of an ideal legislator, unsullied by the whispers and tugs of special 
interests, is confounding.  Hamilton appears to have traded in one set of rose-colored 
glasses for another.  Though she grudgingly acknowledges that legislatures often fail to 
perform their duties in the way that she conceives them,161 she nevertheless insists that 
individualized decisions by legislatures about accommodation are best suited to serve the 
common good.  Whither her Calvinistic pessimism,162 so prominent when the topic was 
the abuses of religion or the oppressive instincts of the general populace? 
Yet even if (1) we assume that legislators are capable of performing consistently 
in the ways that Hamilton suggests, and (2) we accept her point that the legislature can 
and should often act in anti-majoritarian fashion (a highly controversial proposition), and 
(3) we accept as well her somewhat contradictory statements about the value of 
“pluralism” in American society,163 we are simply left with another claim about the 
institutional superiority of the legislature (now advocated as a matter of constitutional 
161 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 279-80.  Indeed, a great part of this book provides evidence of legislative 
failures on just this front.
162 See supra note __.
163
 Hamilton praises American “pluralism” as a laudable cultural quality, id. at 66, but seems not to 
consider that it may be precisely that pluralism that generates the multiplicity of very different views of the 
public good (including those held by members of the legislature), many of which are infused with some 
degree of religious belief.  Indeed, it may fairly be said that her civic republican and pluralist impulses are 
in considerable tension, theoretical as well as historical.  See generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and 
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1706 (2005) (tracing the rise of theories of “participatory” and then 
“deliberative” democracy, including civic republicanism, as explicit reactions against the older theories 
emphasizing pluralism).  Professor Sklansky has these relevant comments on the deep divisions between 
the two theories:
Theories of . . . deliberative democracy reject the pluralists’ reliance on leadership elites, group 
competition, and periodic elections.  They insist on the centrality of what pluralism scorned: 
widespread political participation . . . . [T]he cultural patterns they emphasize are different: instead 
of bargaining and adherence to “rules of the game,” we have . . . a commitment to reason and 
civility (in the case[] of civic republicanism . . .) . . . .
Id. at 1769.  Again, Hamilton does not favor civic republicanism on a broad, popular scale, but she argues 
for something very much like it with respect to the legislature.
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design) to other institutions as the voice of the public good.  If the point is to justify 
legislative civic republicanism as a theory of the substantive public good – that is, to 
claim that the constitutional structure, as Hamilton argues for it, itself advances the publi c 
good – it will not do to cite a few examples where the structure may have coincided with 
what for Hamilton is the right result.  As Hamilton herself is fully aware, there are at least 
as many examples where she believes that the result was wrong. If the public good is to 
have any substantive content, the model of legislative civic republicanism cannot provide 
it.
e. The Public Good as Policy Preference
The preceding sections examined four possible overarching commitments that 
might have supported Hamilton’s concept of the public good, ones that she herself 
intimated were closely related to the concept.  They were not successful in explaining the 
public good.  Perhaps the problem is that Hamilton perceives the public good as a much 
more pragmatic affair.  Under this view, each legislator is simply to choose whatever 
policies she prefers (free from untoward influences, of course) given any particular set of 
circumstances.  Laws that provide categorically for religious accommodation (as any 
other categorical law) limit the legislator’s freedom to decide as she wills.
There is no doubt that Hamilton favors certain policies over others, and favors 
many over those that advance religious accommodation.  For example, religious 
accommodation is less important to her than historic preservation,164 preventing the 
spread of AIDS in Africa,165 clarity with respect to issues of child custody and 
164 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 94.
165 Id. at 76.
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inheritance,166 the right of homosexuals to marry,167 and the interests of residential 
homeowners in maintaining their neighborhood characters.168  She may perhaps favor 
religious accommodation over, for example, certain claims of educational disruption169
and the military’s interest in esprit de corps and unity.170
The difficulty with this theory of the public good is not that it relies on legislators’ 
(or Professor Hamilton’s) policy preferences.  Indeed, we have been searching for some 
substantive content to give shape to Hamilton’s conception of the public good; policy 
preferences of one kind or another are a promising candidate for this task. Furthermore, 
Professor Hamilton is at her most candid when she argues for her own policy preferences, 
perhaps indicating that it is these personal beliefs rather than any grander theory that 
often drives her impassioned rhetoric about the public good.
The problems with this approach are twofold.  First, Hamilton has not explained 
why the particular policies that she identifies  should be universalized by the name “public 
good.” That is, if what she wants is that the legislator be free to enact her (the 
legislator’s) policy preferences, how can Hamilton  claim that a religiously inclined 
legislator, or one who favors religious accommodation, should instead share her 
(Hamilton’s) view of the public good.  Second, and relatedly, a theory of simple policy 
preferences does not account for Hamilton’s particular skepticism about the value of 
religious belief and accommodation in the public good calculus.  It is to this point that I 
turn next.
IV. The Public Good as the Exclusion or Devaluation of 
166 Id.
167 Id. at 65.
168 Id. at 89.
169 Id. at 130.
170 Id. at 171.
40
Certain Religious Interests
It should by now be clear that Hamilton harbors a special distrust of certain 
religious interests. Indeed, perhaps the principal merit of God vs. The Gavel is its often 
harrowing portrayal of the abuses of religious organizations in contemporary American 
culture and its clear-eyed examination of the considerable power of religious advocates 
and lobbyists to promote their interests before Congress.  Does Hamilton believe that 
religious interests could play a role in her concept of the public good?  Hamilton 
frequently gestures in the direction of acknowledging some role for religious views.  But 
her comments on this front are resigned and somewhat depressed.  She says that religion 
is too deeply entrenched in the American psyche to be entirely extricated from the debate 
over the public good.171 For Hamilton, religion is “everywhere,” “inescapable,” and 
cannot be ignored.172
We are looking for a conceptual framework for understanding the type of 
religious beliefs and interests that Hamilton would exclude from the sphere of public 
judgment, and the type of religious beliefs and interests that she feels should be given no 
greater weight than any other beliefs or interests.  Hamilton certainly favors religious 
liberty of a kind.  She opposes laws that display patent animus toward particular 
religions,173 and supports the freedom to speak and believe as one wills.174 However, she
also claims that certain religious interests have no legitimate place in the sphere of public 
debate and she opposes giving special weight to religious beliefs when those beliefs run 
up against other interests that government might deem legitimate – that is, when the time 
171 Id. at 292-93.
172 Id. at 288, 292-93.
173 Id. at 214-16 (discussing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah).
174 Id. at 26.
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comes for legislative decisions (and we have already concluded that Hamilton believes 
that it is the legislature that should be making these decisions) about the public good.
In order to understand better Hamilton’s idea of the public good, we need to 
examine more closely and distinguish among the relevant kinds of religious interests that 
she might or might not admit to the sphere of deliberation over and judgment about the 
public good.  A return to some of Professor Greenawalt’s fine divisions is useful.  Let us 
accept his claim (without undertaking a complete defense of the position) that a religious 
interest is, first, “religious,” meaning that its source lies in some kind of “theistic belief or 
other belief about a realm of ultimate value beyond, or deeper than, ordinary human 
experience.”175  Second, it is an “interest”; the holder of the religious belief wishes to  do 
something with it.  He may simply wish to believe it silently; or he may wish to impose it 
as a law binding on himself and everyone else; or he may wish to do a host of other 
things with it.
At one extreme of the possible range of religious interests lie what Greenawalt 
has called the imposition of comprehensive religious beliefs. If Donna is a Christian 
whose political judgments are shaped entirely by her belief in the literal truth of Holy 
Scripture as the received will of God, Donna has a comprehensive religious belief.
Suppose that Donna is a legislator and votes for a law that would establish Christianity, 
as she understands it, as the supreme law of the land and would outlaw all other religious 
beliefs.  Her interest is one of imposition.176 I believe that Professor Hamilton177 (like 
175 GREENAWALT, supra note __ [PCPR], at 39.
176 Id. at 58.  
177
 In what follows, I attempt to divine Professor Hamilton’s position on a number of hypothetical 
situations on the basis of her claims in God vs. The Gavel, in an effort to pinpoint her public good doctrine.  
I have no reason to know whether Professor Hamilton would actually agree with the positions that I stake 
out for her.  
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most people) would oppose such a religious interest; she would want to exclude it from
consideration of the public good.178  If Donna, holding the same comprehensive religious 
views, voted to pass a law outlawing gay marriage for the single reason that 
homosexuality is anathema to God’s will (i.e., the imposition of a particular religious 
belief by one who holds a comprehensive religious view),179 Hamilton would, in all 
likelihood, argue not only that the putative law is unsound but also that Donna’s views 
should be excluded from the public good calculus.180
Suppose, instead, that Phyllis’s reasons for voting for the ban on gay marriage 
derive both from her religious convictions and from her views that the institution of
homosexual marriage cannot be rationally defended.  Her underlying grounds are partly
religious; she believes that homosexual marriage is inconsistent with God’s will.  But by 
opposing homosexual marriage she does not wish to impose her religious views on 
anyone else because, in addition to her religious reasons, she also feels strongly that the 
institution and traditions of heterosexual marriage, and the secular human goods that it 
serves, are harmed if gay marriage is not officially prohibited.  Suppose that she is able to 
adduce, say, statistical evidence that societies that permit homosexual marriage have 
higher divorce rates for heterosexual marriages than those that prohibit homosexual 
marriage, as well as other data that could support her secular belief in the harm of 
178
 “Exclusion” might entail formally admitting the view but giving it very little or no weight as a practical 
matter.
179
 It makes no difference what Donna’s publicly expressed views are (e.g., that homosexuality is irrational 
or harmful to some secular good, etc.) if Donna’s true reasons for supporting the law stem from religious 
conviction.
180 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 50 (“The hard choices depend on a more broad-ranging inquiry than any 
one religious worldview encompasses (even when that perspective is shared by a significant number of 
individuals and institutions).”).
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homosexual marriage.181 Hamilton, I believe, would exclude this religious interest from 
public good considerations as well. Even if Hamilton might agree that there are some 
legitimate, non-religious reasons for supporting the ban (which is doubtful),182 she would 
claim that the reliance on a religious reason in this case is the overwhelming impetus for 
the law.  If the law were passed, it would compel “nonbelievers to conform to a standard 
of conduct inspired in large measure by religious belief,”183 which amounts to a religious 
imposition.  Note that Hamilton’s reasons for excluding or giving very little to no weight 
to this religious interest, as I have imagined them, would have little to do with what 
Phyllis believes about her (Phyllis’s) position; they instead implicate what Hamilton (or 
the ideal legislator) believes about those views.
One further illustration: Lisa believes that animals should not be treated 
inhumanely.  Her reasons for supporting a farming regulation governing the decent 
treatment of animals before they are slaughtered stem in part from her belief that the 
Bible demands concern for animals.  However, she also is persuaded by secular 
arguments that animals deserve a high degree of respect from humans.  She has no wish 
to see the law pass in order to impose her religious views on those that do not share them.
She thinks the law just because she cares about animals and her reasons are mixed.184
Structurally, Phyllis’s and Lisa’s positions are identical.  Both have religious 
interests.  Neither wishes to impose her religious views on others.  Each supports (or 
believes that she supports) the prospective law in question for both religious and secular 
181
 I assume, for the sake of this argument, that Phyillis’s evidence could withstand some scrutiny, though it 
need not be iron-clad for her to be persuaded by it.
182 Id. at 52-66.
183
 Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 149, 184 (1991).
184
 I owe the framework for this hypothetical to Professor Greenawalt.  GREENAWALT, supra note __ 
[PCPR], at 58-59.
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reasons.  Being religious themselves, both would find it exceedingly difficult to 
disentangle and cull out the religious from the secular reasons for supporting the 
respective laws.  As Professor Steven Smith has said, “[t]he religious citizen supports not 
two severable propositions but rather the single, complex proposition that secular and
religious influences must both play a part in public decisions.”185
Nevertheless, I believe that Hamilton would draw a distinction between the two
positions.  Though she would exclude Phyllis’s religious interest from the domain of the 
public good, she would admit Lisa’s.  Her reason would be that, in this context, the 
religious interest is reasonable because it closely aligns with legitimate secular interests.  
“Citizens may speak from the heart and soul, but it is up to our elected officials to 
contextualize the debate by adding the scope of the public good to all public 
consideration.”186 By “contextualize the debate,” Hamilton means that the ideal 
legislator should analyze the religious interest from a secular standpoint to determine 
whether it should figure into his determination of the public good.  In Lisa’s case, the 
ideal legislator should consider her religious belief in light of the larger context of secular 
reasons for the humane treatment of animals, balancing these against opposed interests, in 
determining the public good.  Hamilton would not give any more weight to Lisa’s 
religious reasons than to other secular reasons, whether supporting or opposing th e law.  
But she would include them in the calculus because they can be squarely reconciled with 
convincing secular arguments in favor of her position.
185
 Steven D. Smith, Separation and the ‘Secular’: Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. 
L. REV. 955, 1010 (1989).
186 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 51.
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This is close to a skeptical or “prudential”187 argument for simple, secular policy 
preferences.  But it differs in an important way: it is a full-bodied belief in (or theory of) 
the ability of the legislature to conduct an individuated inquiry and determination of the 
reasonableness, by secular lights, of particular religious interests.  For Hamilton, whether 
religious interests can play a role in the public good will depend on their compatibility 
with what the ideal legislator deems legitimate secular interests.  If they are highly 
compatible, the ideal legislator can include the religious interest as one more reason in his 
assessment of the public good.  If not, the religious interests are best given little or no 
weight.
All of this – indeed, the entire tone and argumentation of the book – reinforces the 
exquisitely particularized quality of Professor Hamilton’s public good theory and her 
seemingly limitless faith in the powers and capabilities of legislators.  It also grossly 
overestimates the number of difficult moral and social issues that can be resolved 
satisfactorily by reference to secular objectives alone.  “[E]veryone must reach beyond 
commonly accessible reasons to decide many social issues and . . . religious bases for 
such decisions should not be disfavored in comparison with other possible bases.” 188
“Everyone” presumably includes legislators, even idealized ones, as Professor 
Greenawalt cautiously acknowledges.189
187 E.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 99-117 (1995).  Professor Smith argues that, even if one accepts the dubious 
proposition that the religion clauses and the Constitution generally establish an avowedly secular regime, 
secular rationales leave the value of religious freedom to “prudential,” or contextual, concerns, which are 
incapable of being expounded by any unifying theory.  
188 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 113 (1988). 
189 Id. at 237 (“When we turn to legislators relying on their own convictions, the place of religion is more 
controversial.  As a public representative in a state that is separated from religious organizations, perhaps 
the legislator should eschew reliance on religious premises insofar as he can.  Everything I have said so far 
indicates how hard this might be to accomplish, but nonreliance might at least be held up as an ideal.”).
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Hamilton’s generally dim view of religious interests in the numerous examples 
that she provides bespeaks a strong disinclination to countenance them in deciding what 
is good policy (an aversion so powerful  that it blinds her to the considerable legislative 
abuses that she recounts).  The accommodation of religious interests, she believes, often 
tends to do more harm than good.  For example, Hamilton argues that expansive religious 
accommodation is more likely to lead to strife (interdenominational and otherwise), 
which is itself inconsistent with the public good, than an approach that treats religious 
interests no differently than any other interest.190 This view is especially in evidence in 
her discussion of land use conflicts, where she claims that religious organizations have 
sued to enforce their rights under RLUIPA “[i]nstead of finding a middle ground” with 
their opponents.191  It also appears when Hamilton claims that religious accommodation 
somehow injects discrimination into a dispute where it would not otherwise exist, making 
rational, cool-headed, and just resolutions that would “serv[e]” everyone’s interest” more 
difficult.192  In fact, however, Hamilton points to no evidence that religiously motivated 
strife in contemporary America is more rampant, noxious, or divisive than strife of any 
other kind.193
In the face of Greenawalt’s arguments, I am less persuaded that total nonreliance is ideal.  In fact, 
in what follows Greenawalt himself does not argue for total nonreliance, but identifies certain nuances 
(e.g., intensity of conviction and notions of serious wrongs, id. at 238) that might affect the propriety of 
reliance on religious belief.
190 See Hamilton, supra note __ [RI, TND, PG], at 1216.  As a practical matter, it may be that Hamilton 
would accept some consideration of religious interests in developing policy.  But her reasons for doing so 
would not be the belief that decisions favoring religious interests sometimes advance the public good; 
instead, she might countenance religious interests because so many people find religious reasons to be 
important.  
191 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 101.
192 Id. at 94 (“The best result in every land use dispute is the win-win result.”).  Likely this is true of every 
dispute.
193
 Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality is Not Illegitimate in a 
Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 231 (2001) (“American history does not suggest that 
religiously-grounded arguments about controversial political-moral issues – racial discrimination, for 
example, or war – are invariably, or even usually, more divisive than secular debates about those issues.”); 
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In the end, Hamilton’s view of the public good is best characterized as one in 
which religious interests might shape policy, but only if they can be justified to a high
degree by secular reasons.  Her profound disillusionment with the moral authority of 
religious organizations and persons left her seeking a repository for her conviction that 
somebody, or some entity, should be acting in the public interest.  With plausible
constitutional reason, she has selected the legislature to be the bearer of her trust.  But the 
task she has assigned to it – to decide, case-by- case, whether specific religious interests 
deserve government protection by reference to their secular worth – is beyond both the 
legislature’s institutional abilities and its members’ personal capacity for moral judgment. 
see also Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious Arguments Should Be 
Excluded From Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 643 (1999) (“[T]he supposed 
divisiveness, intolerance, and absolutism of religious argument neither distinguishes it nor provides a 
justification for exclusion from democratic politics[.]”).
